



SCAN ME

Middle East: Past is Prologue

Part 6 of 6

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Agenda for Course

1. What is the Middle East?
Who are the Arabs?
What is the source and role of ideology?
2. Competing Promises and Inter-War Problems
3. World War II and the State of Israel
4. Islamism
5. America in the Middle East and Resolutions
- 6. The Management of Savagery and Conclusion**

2

Twenty Five + 1

Competing Promises

Hussein-McMahon Correspondence
 Sykes-Picot Agreement
 Balfour Declaration

Inter-war Problems

Dissolution of the Caliphate
 Increased Jewish Immigration
 Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood
 Arab Uprisings and the 1939 White Paper

“Solutions”

The Final Solution
 The State Solution

The State of Israel and State Responses

1948 War and al-Nakba
 Twin Pillars Policy
 1967 War
 1973 War and the Camp David Accords

Islamism

1979 Iranian Revolution
 Birth of Hezbollah
 Globalized Jihad and the birth of al-Qaeda
 Birth of Hamas
 Intifadas

America in the Middle East

Operation Desert Storm
 Al-Qaeda’s Declaration of War and GWOT

Resolutions

2006 Lebanon War
 Mowing the Grass
 Arab Spring
 The Abraham Accords
 ISIS and the Islamic Revolution

An Appropriate Theory for War


The Management of Savagery

3

Agenda for Today

- 2006 Lebanon War
- Mowing the Grass
- Arab Spring
- The Abraham Accords
- ISIS and the Islamic Revolution
- The Axis of Resistance
- The Management of Savagery
- Books to Read

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6

Lebanon and the Middle East



Hezbollah and Maneuver in the Narrative Space

- Hezbollah defeated Israel three times
 - 1982
 - 1985
 - 2006
- Hezbollah is a product of narrative space shifts in the terrain
- Hezbollah has changed
 - resistance
 - social network
 - political party
 - invader and occupier

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Lebanon




The map shows Lebanon's geographical context. Major cities include Beirut (marked with a star), Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, and Nabouira. Key locations like Chekka, Batroun, Jbail, Jouinié, Baalbek, Zahlé, Jezzine, and Hermel are also labeled. The Mediterranean Sea is to the west. Neighboring countries are Syria to the north and Israel to the south. The Golan Heights (Israeli occupied) and UNDOF Zone are shown in the south. The Bekaa Valley and Lebanon Mountains are also indicated. A scale bar shows 0, 10, and 20 km and 0, 10, and 20 miles.

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2006 Lebanon War



INS Hanit
14 July 2006



Qana, Lebanon
30 July 2006



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What Has it Come To



31 May 2010



10

Withdrawal from Lebanon – 2000



11

Gilad Shalit



Captured by Hamas:

25 Jun 2006

Released for 1027 prisoners:


18 Oct 2011



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Historiography

- Changing interpretations
 - 2006
 - complete defeat
 - humiliation
 - myth destroyed
 - 2010
 - success through violence – most peaceful border
 - bomb Beirut

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Mowing the Grass

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Israel's Wars


	2023-2024	Israel-Hamas War
	2022	Operation Breaking Dawn
	2014	Operation Protective Edge
	2012	Operation Pillar of Defense
	2008 - 2009	Operation Cast Lead
State vs. Non-State	2006	Israel-Hezbollah War
Occupation of Southern Lebanon	2000	Second Intifadah
	1987	First Intifadah
	1982	Operation Peace for Galilee
State vs. State	1973	Yom Kippur War
	1967	Six-Day War
	1956	Suez War
Non-State vs. State	1947 - 1948	War of Independence
	1920 - 1947	Zionist Insurgency

Mowing the Grass

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As 'Arab Spring' moves into Fall


The death of Libyan dictator Moammer Gadhafi is yet another chapter in the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East, where some are seeking to replace repressive governments with freer, more democratic ones. A look at the status of the conflicts:

TUNISIA
The birthplace of the "Arab Spring" will hold its first post-revolution elections Oct. 23, selecting an assembly to draft a constitution and form an interim government; Islamist parties are expected to do well


SYRIA
President Bashar Assad's regime continues its crackdown on protests that the U.N. estimates has killed 3,000 people so far; there are signs that demonstrators, who were mostly peaceful, have opted to meet the government's violence with force of their own



President Bashar Assad




LIBYA
Moammar Gadhafi's death in effect ends NATO's military operation and allows the ruling Transitional National Council to form a government and proceed with elections; leaders now must contend with scores of armed militias



Moammar Gadhafi


BAHRAIN
U.S. government has been more tepid in its support for the democracy movement in the country where it bases the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet, and was just forced to delay a \$53-million arms sale to the government after a backlash from human rights groups



King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa

EGYPT
A military council continues to rule; elections are scheduled for Nov. 28 to choose a parliament that will write a new constitution, but the forces that led the revolution have split, with secular leaders worried about the rising power of Islamist political groups

YEMEN
Violence surged after President Ali Abdullah Saleh returned unexpectedly from Saudi Arabia, where he was recovering from an attempted assassination; Saleh has agreed to step down several times, only to renege



President Ali Abdullah Saleh

Source: AP, Reuters, ESRI, MCT Photo Service, Los Angeles Times reporting
Graphic: Tom Reinken, Khang Nguyen, Los Angeles Times © 2011 MCT
<http://theloquiter.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/editorialinfographic.jpg>

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Muslim Brotherhood



Countries With Political Parties Tied to the Muslim Brotherhood

● Party with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood
 ● Muslim Brotherhood party banned



Source: Bloomberg
COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypt-muslim-brotherhood>

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The Abraham Accords

23



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ISIS and the Islamic Revolution

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Dominant Story in Iraq

ISIS: Made in the USA

Is the rise of radical Islam a “failure” of US policy or precisely what the hidden hand of US policy wants?

<https://josephfreedomoranchy.blogspot.com/2015/10/america-created-al-qaeda-and-isis.html>

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


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<http://corporatewelfare.org/articles/2002/iraqgate/>

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Iran-Contra Hearings



<https://bluenationreview.com/5-terrible-things-ronald-reagan-president/>
<https://philebersole.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/iranconratimecover.jpg>
<http://rickwrites.blogspot.com/2007/07/iraq-iran-latest-revelation-we-smell.html>

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ISIS Uniform?



© REUTERS

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3253113/From-Afghani-robe-suicide-bomber-s-black-uniform-ISIS-differentiates-ranks-various-outfits.html>

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ISIS Vehicle?



<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/mosul-residents-one-year-on-isis-brutality>

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ISIS has U.S. MREs?


“In one typical recent video that appeared on the Facebook page of a Shiite militia, a lawmaker with the country’s biggest militia group, the Badr Organization, waves apparently new U.S military MREs (meals ready to eat) — one of them chicken and dumplings — allegedly found at a recently captured Islamic State base in Baiji, offering proof, he said, of U.S. support.”

Liz Sly

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqis-think-the-us-is-in-cahoots-with-isis-and-it-is-hurting-the-war/2015/12/01/d00968ec-9243-11e5-befa-99ceebcbb272_story.html


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American Capability



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ISIS Founders?



Common Internet Memes

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Battle of Mosul

Narrative-Led 2014		Kinetic-Led 2016-2017	
<small>(4+ yrs prep)</small> 6	Days	<small>(2+ yrs prep)</small> 278	
1,000	Attacking Force	110,000	
60,000	Defending Force	9,000	
1:60	Ratio of Attacker to Defender	12:1	
105+	Attacking Force Killed	<small>* (possibly 3-5x)</small> 1,400	
6,500	Defending Force Killed	8,000	
1:65	Ratio of Attacker to Defender Killed	<small>* (~ 1:2 to 1:1.1)</small> 1:6	
<1%	Infrastructure Damaged/Destroyed	>60%	
Unknown	Civilians Killed	25,000	
500,000	Civilians Displaced	900,000	

All figures are estimates.

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How did this happen?

1. It didn't just happen in 2014.
2. It wasn't simply the addition of social media.
3. This was part of a campaign.
4. The answers teach us how narrative war is conducted.

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ISIS

Use of social media
to generate a bow
wave of fear and
concern.

**My caveat is that is
wasn't just social
media.**

LikeWar
The Weaponization
of Social Media

P. W. Singer
Emerson T. Brooking

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Narrative Preparation
Engagement, Testimonials, and Commitment

There is a problem!

Clanging of the Swords series (June and August 2012, November 2013, January 2014)

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Narrative Preparation Coercion, Intimidation, and Threats



ISIS will solve the problem!

Clanging of the Swords series (June and August 2012, November 2013, January 2014)

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Narrative Preparation Capacity, Capability, and Governance



ISIS can solve the problem!


Clanging of the Swords series (June and August 2012, November 2013, January 2014)

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Why ISIS calls for jihad
Apocalypse and the Roman-Crusaders

The spark has been lit here in Iraq,
 and its heat will continue to intensify
 – by Allah’s permission – until it burns
 the crusader armies in Dabiq.

- Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi



Quoted in *Dabiq*, Issue 1, page 2.
<http://schoolweb.eduzones.com/uploads/20140116141835TcNhqe8/contents/20140307152600.jpg>

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Why Dabiq



DABIQ 1435
 THE FLOOD

DABIQ 1435
 THE RETURN OF KHILAFAH

DABIQ 1435
 A CALL TO HIJRAH

DABIQ 1435
 REMAINING AND EXPANDING

DABIQ 1435
 THE FAILED CRUSADE

FEATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE FINAL CRUSADE
 ARTICLE: THE REVIVAL OF SLAVERY BEFORE THE HOUR

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Where is Dabiq?

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/68/Syrian_Civil_War_map.svg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Syrian_Civil_War_detailed_map

Current military situation: **Red:** Syrian Government, **Green:** Syrian Opposition, **Yellow:** Federation of North Syria (SDF), **Grey:** Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, **White:** Jabhat Fateh al-Sham

(for a more detailed map, see [Cities and towns during the Syrian Civil War](#)). Map above was last updated on 10 September 2016.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war

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Master Narratives

another way to look at this

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Pharoah 2. The Jahiliyah 3. The Battle of Badr 4. The Hypocrites 5. The Battle of Khaybar 6. The Battle of Karbala 7. The Mahdi 8. The Infidel Invaders 9. Shaytan's Handiwork 10. 1924 11. The Nakba 12. 72 Virgins 	<p>Arrogant tyrant rejects word of God</p> <p>Muslims are in a state of ignorance</p> <p>Muslims can overcome any odds</p> <p>Insiders are a threat</p> <p>Jews are oathbreakers</p> <p>Better to die than to live under tyranny</p> <p>Pave the way</p> <p>Crusaders and Mongols</p> <p>Vices and Temptations</p> <p>No longer unity</p> <p>Catastrophe to be rectified</p> <p>Rewards for the righteous</p>
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Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism
 Jeffrey R. Halverson, H. L. Goodall, Jr., and Steven R. Corman 2011

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How ISIS sees the fight

Seeing the Layers of Narrative

Major Themes that Resonate

- Remaining and Expanding (Everywhere Caliphate)
- Tawhid
- Prophetic methodology
- Common grievances

Strategic Approach

- Call for and Create the Caliphate
 - Awaken Muslims (western and Shia threat)
 - Compel Muslims (civil war – extinction of the grayzone)
- Draw America in to the Middle East
 - Discredit allies of America
 - Weaken apostate or idolatrous states
- Exhaust America **500,000 : 1**
- Defeat Enemies
- Rule the Caliphate

The diagram shows a globe with two hands at the top. It features several concentric green rings around a central red dot, all contained within a larger, irregular red outline that suggests a global or regional focus.

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History of ISIS in 7 Periods

1. Operating in al-Qaeda’s Shadow	1999-2006
2. A State is Declared	2006-2010
3. Arab Spring	2010-2014
4. Building the State	2011-2014
5. Declaring the State	2014
6. Defending the State	2014-2017
7. ISIS Remains	2017-Present

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Guidance on Insurgent Tactics

Arabic Title: “Bringing Down the Towns Temporarily as a Method of Operation for the Mujahideen”

- “Islamic State Insurgent Tactics: Translation and Analysis”
- Four articles published in 2019: 26 Apr, 17 May, 2x 19 May
- Translated by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
- In many ways this set of articles is similar to Robert Roger’s 28 “Rules of Ranging” from the Ranger Handbook. These are suggestions for how to conduct operations rather than requirements. They are informative. Our opponent has regularly told us what he wanted to do or how he planned to do it. This is no different.
- If *The Management of Savagery* is an ISIS operational concept these articles provide conceptual tactics, techniques, and procedures



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
Bringing Down the Towns Temporarily as a Method of Operation for the Mujahideen

- Acknowledges that the mujahidin cannot consolidate gains. Within that environment do the following:
 - o Surprise enemy only when a superior force
 - o Study and prepare for withdrawal – “... as its objective is not to hold to the land and defend it ...”
 - o Early Islamic military successes of the 7th century were accomplished through moving into Persian or Roman lands from the desert and, if challenged by strong forces, fleeing back to the desert. In this way, these early Muslim armies have been described as acting like navies in that they could attack from the desert as they chose and when they chose and deny battle in a similar manner. Here one can see the same logic being extolled.
 - o Timing and target location selection – burst operations
- Nikaya can be translated as **damage**, but it has other meanings that may help to illuminate what is meant by damage: wrong, harm, damage, prejudice; vexation, annoyance, grievance, offense, outrage, chicanery. In this context, the meaning is one of **damage to achieve a desired end – forcing an intended conduct by the enemy. This isn’t destruction for the sake of destruction, but rather to achieve a purpose.**
- Exhaustion – “... the aim from assaulting a village or locality and assaulting the enemy in it is to harass the enemy into sending forces from neighbouring regions to save their soldiers who seek help from them, while there will lie in wait for the reinforcements ambushes of the mujahideen and their IEDs on the ways to slaughter them, and inflict on them the greatest losses. ... and the request is for every position to rely on itself, while the soldiers may resort to fleeing from the positions or surrendering when they are exposed to an attack that they consider to be beyond their ability of defend against ...”
- The goal is to return to governance.


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The Axis of Resistance


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The Management of Savagery

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The Management of Savagery

The Deceptive Media Halo

Halo depicts power and holiness and not holiness alone.

“... the two superpowers must resort to using a **deceptive media halo** which portrays these powers as non-coercive and world-encompassing, able to reach into every earth and heaven **as if they possess the power of the Creator of creation.**” ⁽¹⁷⁾



[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halo_\(religious_iconography\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halo_(religious_iconography))

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*The Management of Savagery***Problems and Weakness of the Halo**

“When a state submits – whatever the extent of its ability – to the illusion of the deceptive power and behaves on this basis, that is when its downfall begins.” ⁽¹⁸⁾

“The overwhelming military power (weapons, technology, fighters) has no value without the cohesion of society and the cohesion of (society’s) institutions and sectors. But this overwhelming military power may become a curse to this great superpower if the cohesion of society [literally “the social entity”] collapses.” ⁽¹⁸⁾

“... this is because the power of its centralization, embodied by the overwhelming military power and the deceptive media halo, can only be in a cohesive society.” ⁽¹⁹⁾

“What if this assisting element [to the ummah] is the decree of God ... It would not only work to activate the latent elements of cultural annihilation but confront the military power with exhaustion. This confrontation and exhaustion directly affects ... the deceptive media halo. It removes the aura of invincibility which this power projects, that nothing at all stands in front of it.” ⁽¹⁹⁾

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*The Management of Savagery***“It’s the economy, stupid.”**

“Additionally, note that the economic weakness resulting from the burdens of war or from aiming blows of vexation (al-nikāya) directly toward the economy is the most important element of cultural annihilation since it threatens the opulence and (worldly) pleasures which those societies thirst for. Then competition for these things begins after they grow scarce due to the weakness of the economy. Likewise, social iniquities rise to the surface on account of the economic stagnation, which ignites political opposition and disunity among the (various) sectors of society [literally “social entity”] in the central country.” ⁽²⁰⁾

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The Management of Savagery

Perception of U.S.

“O people! The viciousness of the Russian soldier is double that of the American (soldier). If the number of Americans killed is one tenth of the number of Russians killed in Afghanistan and Chechnya, they will flee, heedless of all else.” (23)

“The human structure of the enemy is weak with regards to battle. He compensates for that by using gadgets, (but) it is not possible for him to depend on them for ever. Likewise, the enemy compensates for that by using a deceptive media halo and using media deception during each of his movements and when confronting any action from the mujahids. Therefore, understanding the media politics of the adversaries and dealing with them is very important in winning the military and political battle.” (95)

“Therefore, we can say that [the enemy] wants:

1. To shorten the duration of the battle as much as possible.
2. To keep his troops from bloodshed as much as possible because he knows that this will scare his troops and it will be one of the factors in prolonging the battle.” (191)

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The Management of Savagery

“the administration of savagery”

Primary Goals (42-44)

1. Spreading internal security and preserving it in every region that is managed
2. Providing food and medical treatment
3. Securing the region of savagery from the invasions of enemies by setting up defensive fortifications and developing fighting capacities
4. Establishing Sharia justice among the people who live in the regions of savagery
5. Raising the level of faith and combat efficiency during the training of the youth of the region of savagery and establishing a fighting society at all levels and among all individuals by means of making them aware of its importance. But it must be made clear that it is an obligatory duty [wujūbihi al-muta’ayyan], which does not mean that every individual member of society must practice fighting; rather, only a part or portion of the fighting ranks (must practice it) in the form which the society knows best and needs.
6. Working for the spread of legal, Sharia science (putting the most important aspects before those of lesser importance) and worldly science (putting the most important aspects before those of lesser importance).
7. Disseminating spies and seeking to complete the construction of a minimal intelligence agency.
8. Uniting the hearts of the people by means of money and uniting the world by Sharia governance and (compliance with) rules which are at least exemplified by individuals in the administration.
9. Deterring the hypocrites with proof and other means and forcing them to repress and conceal their hypocrisy, to hide their discouraged opinions, and to comply with those in authority until their evil is put in check.
10. Working until it is possible to expand and attack the enemies in order to repel them, plunder their money, and place them in a constant state of apprehension and desire for reconciliation.
11. Establishing coalitions with those with whom coalitions are permitted, those who have not given complete allegiance to the administration.
12. To these we add a future goal, which is the advancement of managerial groups toward the attainment of the “power establishment” and readiness for plucking the fruit (of their efforts) and establishing the state.

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The Management of Savagery

“the administration of savagery”

Plan of Action and Movement

“Sequential strikes against America ...” ⁽⁴⁴⁾

“The inevitable result of this escalating sequence is the fall of the prestige of America among the masses and among the elites of the world in the armies of apostasy.” ⁽⁴⁴⁾

“America will either seek revenge and the conflict will intensify or it will launch a limited war. In the case of the latter, its grudge will not be satisfied and it will not succeed in curbing this escalating expansion.” ⁽⁴⁵⁾

Traps for America ⁽⁴⁵⁾

- First trap – invasion of Afghanistan
- Second trap – is to put (America’s) armies, which occupy the region and set up military bases in it without resistance, in a state of war with the masses in the region.

Focus on economic targets. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

Hitting economic targets will force (the enemy) to goad the regimes, who are (already) exhausted from protecting the other remaining targets (economic or otherwise), into pumping in more forces for its protection. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

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The Management of Savagery

“the administration of savagery”

Plan of Action and Movement (continued)

Hit soft targets.

“Diversify and widen the vexation strikes against the crusader-Zionist enemy in every place in the Islamic world, and even outside of it if possible, so as to disperse the efforts of the alliance of the enemy and thus drain it to the greatest extent possible.” ⁽⁴⁶⁾

Strike when potential victims have their guard down. Sow fear in general populations, damage economies.

“If a tourist resort that the crusaders patronise ... is hit, all of the tourist resorts in all of the states of the world will have to be secured by the work of additional forces, which are double the ordinary amount, and a huge increase in spending.” ⁽⁴⁶⁾

Inspire youth.

“Capture the rebelliousness of youth, their energy and idealism, and their readiness for self-sacrifice, while fools preach ‘moderation’ (wasatiyyah), security and avoidance of risk.” (quoted in The Guardian and not from Management of Savagery)

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*The Management of Savagery***Specific Points – Hybrid Approach** ⁽⁵⁰⁻⁵¹⁾

- A **military strategy** working to **disperse** the efforts and forces of the enemy and to **exhaust and drain its monetary and military capabilities**.
- A **media strategy** targeting and focusing on **two classes**. (The first) class is **the masses**, in order to push a large number of them to join the jihad, offer positive support, and adopt a negative attitude toward those who do not join the ranks. The second class is the **troops of the enemy** who have lower salaries, in order to push them to join the ranks of the mujahids or at least to flee from the service of the enemy.
- After a suitable period of time, we will work for:
 - Developing a **military strategy** in order **to push the forces of the enemy to pull back around the economic targets in order to protect them**.
 - Developing the **media strategy** such that it reaches and targets the heart of the middle leadership of the armies of apostasy in order **to push them to join the jihad**.
 - Plan, prepare, and train for the exploitation of the results of the previous points—the outbreak of chaos and savagery.
 - Establishing a **media plan** which seeks, in each of these stages, **rational and Sharia justification** for the operations, especially (targeting) the masses. (It must be a plan) which escapes the captivity of targeting individuals of the other Islamic groups, who already understand everything! However, the masses are a difficult factor which will be our back and our support in the future, provided that there is transparency in this plan and even an acknowledgment of errors sometimes. This will reveal the lies and tricks of the enemy and firmly establish the impression of our truthfulness among the masses.

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*The Management of Savagery***Never Ending** ⁽⁶⁷⁾

As for operations in the form of waves, that is suitable for groups whose military bases and defensive positions are impregnable, but remote from the site of the operations. Likewise, it is suitable for groups that want to **send a message to the enemy** that waves of fear and paying the price for its actions will never end, and **that the cessation of operations for a period of time does not mean this is a permanent stoppage**, such that the enemy may do whatever it wishes with the Muslim masses; rather, **we are preparing for another wave of operations which will fill their hearts with fear and this fear will have no end**, and it behooves the enemy to cease its evil against the Muslims or to minimize it so that when God decrees something, it is done. I believe this method of waves is suitable for most of the groups in the secondary countries, which we mentioned in the previous topic.

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How does this relate to ISIS? Post-State Actor

“Those who follow them are their slaves. They look to the modern civilization of Satan and their sick minds imagine that the awaited nation of Islam is a nation represented in the United Nations, living with its neighbors and having mutual interests with them. The reality is that the Islamic state is predicated [on] the curtailment of all of that.” ⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

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What does this mean to you (and me)?

- They write what they intend
- Take them at their word
- We need to read and study what they write
- For example, Western political and military leaders have praised their efforts at preventing another 9/11 when “they” haven’t been trying another 9/11 since, at the latest, 2004.
- Understanding them, leads to understanding where they are heading – it is almost certain that they are no longer on cycle 8. There is probably a cycle 9 or 10 by now.



Revolutionary (ISIS) Cycles

1. Post-WWII Revolutionary War
2. End of Arab Nationalism
3. Rise of Islamism (Iranian Revolution)
4. Victory of the Mujahedeen
5. Declaration of War Against US
6. Post 9/11 Transformation
7. Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War
8. “Stray Dogs”

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Proportionality

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Proportionality in *jus ad bellum*

- **Principle: The Means Must Be Proportionate to the Just Cause**
- Material taken from the *Department of Defense Law of War Manual* (DoD LoWM)
- For example, the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defense is to be judged according to the nature of the threat being addressed. (DoD LoWM § 1.11.1.2.)
- Proportionality is generally defined as "the principle that even where one is justified in acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive." (DoD LoWM, § 2.4)
 - Excessive harm: Combatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of life or injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack, would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. (DoD LoWM §5.10, 5.12.)
 - Feasible precautions: Combatants must take feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other protected persons and objects; (DoD LoWM §5.10, 5.11.)
 - Effective advance warning must be given of an attack that may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. (DoD LoWM §5.11.5.)
 - Provided that all other factors are equal, the object selected for attack shall be the object which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilians. (DoD LoWM §5.11.7)
- In *jus ad bellum*, proportionality requires that the State's means in resorting to force be proportionate to its just cause in using force, such as the threat that the State seeks to address. (DoD LoWM § 2.4.2.)

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Proportionality in *jus in bello*

2022 Operational Law Handbook, III.B.3.

Proportionality. To comply with the proportionality criterion, States must **limit** the magnitude, scope, and duration of any use of force **to that level of force which is reasonably necessary to counter a threat or attack**. In the context of *jus ad bellum*, proportionality is sometimes referred to as “proportionate force.” However, the principle does not require limiting the response to mirror the type of force constituting the threat or attack.

DoD Law of War Manual

2.4 PROPORTIONALITY

Proportionality may be defined as the principle that even where one is justified in acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive.

5.10 PROPORTIONALITY IN CONDUCTING ATTACKS

In accordance with the principle of proportionality, combatants must not exercise the right to engage in attacks against military objectives in an unreasonable or excessive way. Therefore, when prosecuting attacks against military objectives (i.e., the persons and objects that may be made the object of attack), combatants must exercise due regard to reduce the risk of incidental harm to the civilian population and other persons and objects that may not be made the object of attack. In particular, the following rules apply:

- Combatants must take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to **reduce the risk of harm** to civilians and other persons and objects protected **from being made the object of attack**; and
- Combatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be **excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained**.

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Conclusion

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BBC Report

Rocket or Missile Strike on the al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza City

17 October (0:01:12)



BBC **LIVE JERUSALEM**

If this report is so incorrect, and it is, then why is it still posted and not taken down as misinformation on YouTube or from the BBC?

 Why did and do people believe this report?

 The answers are in understanding narrative space as part of narrative war.

Edited for brevity. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTgMa34kh9o>

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Books to Read

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Recommended Books

					
<p>2007 Great discussion of the historical evolution of the salafi-jihadi-takfiri ideology up to 9/11.</p>	<p>2017 A searing reassessment of U.S. military policy in the Middle East over the past four decades.</p> <p>2014 Understanding another culture from its perspective.</p>	<p>2009 How the Ottoman Empire and the last caliphate was destroyed.</p> 	<p>2013 Afghanistan's complexity explained through a dive into a single district and looking across 30 years of history.</p>	<p>2017 Did The Surge work? If so, why? The author believes that it did work against AQJ, but failed against ISIS and this book explains the why for both.</p>	<p>2004 (2006) Operational Strategy. The way to fight America is by destroying its media halo and then by exhausting it under the weight of its own security.</p>

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