Narrative War in Iran: Observations, Rules, and Thoughts

​I feel it necessary to state that I am not seeking to make partisan points.  I am only trying to present my appreciation of what I am seeing.  None of this is comprehensive, however, I believe these are points that need to be made.

Operation Epic Fury is slightly more than four weeks old as I write this.  The day before the operation began I participated in a poorly attended panel discussion on the Iranian protests, and the members of the panel were asked to provide thoughts on ways to deal with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary regime in Tehran.  I had recently consumed a variety of podcasts that included perspectives from radically different viewpoints concerning Iran from those who felt that we had no business using military force against Iran because it was not an imminent or direct threat to the United States of America and those who felt that now was the right time to deal with the Iranian regime.  I shared with the dozens of audience members in attendance my somewhat conflicting thoughts regarding these two opposing perspectives.

I felt both groups reflected in the podcasts were wrong.  One, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been an avowed enemy of the United States of America since November 1979 and has regularly called for death to America.  Iranian leaders have called for the destruction of America for so long and so often that I think many people became desensitized to those calls as if those making the threats didn’t really believe what they were saying.  I think that those same people forgot how many Americans had been killed through direct or second-hand Iranian actions.  These deaths were a form of earnest payment on the part of the Islamic Republic.  Iran meant what it said and was a threat to the United States of America and it was only a matter of time before Iran would have killed more Americans.  Two, the United States of America has not had a strong track record of getting appropriate effect from violence inflicted.  Bombing and invading had not recently produced desirable results and there was little evidence that such efforts might do so now.

​These two points meant that humility was needed regarding what one believed might happen.  As we are now more than four weeks into this campaign, I want to emphasize that humility is needed in predictions.  No one knows what is going to happen and anyone who offers strong statements about quagmires or about immediate success is inappropriately certain.  I am not going to do so.  I want to express a couple of observations in that these are things that I think are real and not opinion, rules related to narrative war as they apply to Iran, and thoughts regarding the narrative war going on.

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Observations

• Donald J. Trump does not play the standard national security game or he does not play it by the same rules.  I am uncertain whether President Trump plays a different game entirely or he is playing by a radically different set of rules.  It may be that the distinction between the two is irrelevant.  What I mean by this different game/rules can be illustrated by a player showing up at Wimbledon with a Louisville Slugger baseball bat and jacking the tennis ball serve out of the stadium.  Every commentator in the stadium would be shocked and confused by what they just witnessed.  They would call out the player for committing some sort of foul or error because it was not what they expected to see when they sat down in their studio.  This is not a judgment of whether the difference is good or bad.  It is different.  If one does not observe and evaluate Donald J. Trump based off his actions and results, then one is missing the game being played because of anachronistic expectations.
• This is the single most impressive display of precision bombing ever.  Everyone should be sitting back and watching in sheer amazement at the technical and tactical brilliance on display.  One should compare World War II B-17 and B-29 raids of dozens and sometimes hundreds of aircraft dropping thousands of bombs that struggled to hit a specific building.  In 2026, a single bomb hits a single specific target with near 100% accuracy.  That is a revolutionary change in precision.  What does that mean?  Does it mean that a country can win through air power?  I don’t know.  I do think that before one speaks with certainty, one needs to reflect on the possibilities and, at least, acknowledge the amazing technical and tactical brilliance on display.
• The bombing campaign is young and impatience is dangerous.  The air campaign for Operation Desert Storm lasted for six weeks and that was a smaller area and a more focused target set.  Bombing campaigns do not unfold all at once.  They come in phases.
• This is the most divisive military campaign in American constitutional history.  I state constitutional as one might say that the American Revolutionary War was more divisive, but we weren’t a constitutional republic then.  In the conduct of this war I have heard a former CIA director state that he believed statements made by members of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran more than those made by the President of the United States.  I have heard the minority leader of the senate unable to agree that a reduction in Iranian ballistic missiles is a good thing only to be corrected by MS Now host Joe Scarborough.  It seems like the idea that foreign policy debates stop at the water’s edge has long since died.  These are not the most extreme comments made in opposition to the war, but the people making the statements and the positions they held or hold are what make them so remarkable.  The observation that I am making is that neither of these statements under any other circumstances by people holding their former or current positions would have ever been uttered.

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Narrative War and National Security Rules

​In Narrative War: The Philosophy of Social Conflict I offer the following rules of social conflict.

Rule 1: Actors (nations, states, and non-states) act in accordance with their narrative --
                      they do what they are.
Rule 2: Actors publish their narrative — they write what they are.
                       Corollary: Believe what they write.
Rule 3: All foreign policy or war or social conflict issues are local -- actors act in                           accordance with what matters locally.
Rule 4: Money does not change what actors are
                       Corollary A: If an actor is already corrupt, then you can buy it off.
                       Corollary B: If an actor is not already corrupt, then it cannot be bought                                                   off or it must first be corrupted and then refer to corollary A.
What these rules mean is that one must understand an actor for what it is.  Believe what it says.  And avoid mirror imaging what is possible with respect to changing its behavior.

In another article seeking to describe the necessary history for understanding the Middle East which I posted on this blog site, I stated the following and I believe that it still holds true four weeks into the bombing campaign.

When Iran calls for the destruction of Israel or refers to the United States as the Great Satan, when Hamas calls for the elimination of Israel, or al-Qaeda states that it is on the side of God, believe them.  Yes, it is poetic hyperbole, but like with scripture that also uses poetic hyperbole, they believe it to be an expression of truth to be enacted in the world.  They mean what they say.  They are seeking to create a world in which those statements will be made true.  That doesn’t mean that there is no room for negotiation or temporary agreement, but such negotiators should never confuse the short term with actual belief.  For example, just because one of these actors makes a deal, doesn’t mean that that actor now wants to become a part of the international order and be welcomed into the family of nations that follows rules established by secular or other religious leaders and countries.

The second set of rules relates to interactions with possible revolutionary countries.

• No revolution succeeds so long as an army pulls triggers.  This means that regardless of the size, scope, or scale of protests, so long as the regime military is willing to kill civilians then the revolution or protest will fail.
• Never trust an exile.  Obviously, when someone uses the word never, it should be assumed that it is done for hyperbolic effect.  Some exiles have been useful.  Generally speaking, exiles often oversell their importance to the society from which they were exiled.  Even if an exile is useful, that person should always be treated with an appropriate amount of skepticism.
• Humans can adapt to anything.  Observers of atrocities and horrible living conditions often use inhuman or intolerable as descriptive words for the treatment or the conditions.  While many of the so-described conditions are despicable, what is often the case is that such environments continue to produce human existence and, most of the time, increasing birth rates.  There is no environment that humans cannot adapt to, tolerate, and continue to perpetuate the species.  This isn’t an endorsement of such conditions.  This rule is a reminder that simply increasing human suffering does not change human behavior.  Humans will cling to their societal narratives through some of the worst environments imaginable.

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Thoughts
I am a natural contrarian and that means that when most opinions are going in a certain direction then, almost as a reflex, I go in the opposite direction.  That does not make me necessarily correct.  I recognize the trend in my thinking, and I have been wrong in the past from following this approach.  I have also been surprised by the certain vitriol regarding Operation Epic Fury.  People who I normally characterize as thoughtful and centrist or even conservative have been declaring with certainty that this operation is a debacle when nothing of the sort has yet to happen.  This cacophony of Casandras has caused me to question the criticisms and think about what they and I have been missing.  Here are my thoughts.

• Donald Trump is a unique actor who seeks for deals rather than diplomacy.  He is not ideologically motivated nor captured.  I think his lack of ideological purity makes it difficult for him to mirror-image those leaders who are deeply ideological.  Vladimir Putin is seemingly interpreted as a man looking for a deal rather than a committed nationalist seeking to return lost territory and willing to sacrifice his nation to get it.  Iran is similarly seen as an economic or secular actor that can be pressured out of ideological positions through enticements or pain.  Religiously motivated people often double down on their ideology when pressured.  I do not know that President Trump empathizes with that type of thinking.  I spend no time with the president, and he has not shared his approach to thought and reflection with me.  I am offering what I believe I have observed.
• For all those calling for diplomacy, I have some thoughts as well.  The U.S. military teaches its officers that there are four instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic.  The more I reflect on this teaching the more I question it.  In Narrative War I define war as “the effort to change an opponent to conform with the will and virtue (values) of the actor.”  I go on to say that war in this sense is expressed “…as a contest of power even though Clausewitz informs his reader repeatedly that war is a contest of wills.  …  To win, one must account for not only will, but the source of that will — virtue.”  If I am right that to win a war means that one needs to change an opponent, then power needs to be focused on the opposing will and not just on agreements or diplomatic engagements.  Diplomacy, in this context, has no power at all.  Contractual agreements only work to change behavior so long as both parties agree to the authority that is officiating.  Iran rejects the global order created by the United States following World War II.  Just because Iran references United Nations’ agreements doesn’t mean that it holds to them or reverences them.  Iran references them because it believes there are segments of the West and the United States that reverence such statements and agreements.  Diplomatic efforts will only be used by Iran to muddy the process and not to resolve or reflect change.  Iran will use diplomacy to chain America and not to constrain Iran.  This is where Trump’s conduct is useful in that he isn’t playing the same game that every other president has for the past 47 years.
• Iran is being physically crushed in this campaign.  It has no navy.  It has no air force.  It is losing its missile and rocket forces.  If this campaign continues for another month, Iran may not have a capable ground force.  It is certain, that if the campaign continues then Iran will lose military influence over the Straits of Hormuz and effectively lose all geopolitical influence.  This isn’t nothing.  Everyone who is simply pointing out risks and dangers is missing this amazing and meaningful set of accomplishments.
• What is Iran’s hope.  Iran needs a savior and it doesn’t care who it is.  Iran is hoping that the fragmented American societal narrative will further fragment and lead to a premature end to the campaign in a way that allows it to rise from the ashes.  Iran needs the savior before it loses control of the straits.  If the savior comes after that then it doesn’t matter so much as Iran will be a religious government ruling over a tortured and untrusted people with massive domestic concerns regarding basic needs like water, food, and power.
• What am I looking for?
  • If there is an Iranian division commander (it could be a collection of brigade/regimental commanders, but that probably won’t be sufficient) or above who directs his unit not to kill civilians.  If that happens, then the regime may collapse and some workable result may evolve from it.
  • Control of the Straits of Hormuz.  Can the U.S. gain control of the straits?  Does shipping continue along something like a normal routine?
  • The actions of ethnic minorities in Iran.  The Kurds, Baloch, Azeris, and other groups which have often had confrontational relations with Tehran may opt to do something that can tip the tables.  Do they?  President Trump called in his initial statements for the people of Iran to overthrow their government and that this would be the best time to do so.  He was right.  It is possible that nothing will happen in this regard as I refer back to my previous rule regarding whether or not the army pulls triggers.
• How does one consolidate gains in this demonstration of tactical dominance?  How does one turn the technical and tactical victories into something bigger?  Is it possible to rewrite the societal narrative through precision targeting?  Because of my definition of war, I think that wars are won by rewriting the opponent’s societal narrative, at least, to accept the fact that it was defeated.  I am yet to be convinced that it is possible to do this through precision targeting, but that doesn’t mean that it is impossible for it to happen.  The jury is still out, and we should wait for it to return before pronouncing profound judgments about war in 2026.

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I conclude my thoughts by saying that I believe it to be good that senior leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran are no longer on earth.  It is good that Iran no longer has a blue water navy with the capability to seize ocean going vessels.  It is good that Iran’s missile production and launching capability is significantly reduced.  It is good that Iran is weakened in the world even if that weakening is only for a limited time.

No other president has done this because Operation Epic Fury either breaks the rules or introduces a new game to international affairs.  I offer a reminder that about seven weeks prior to Epic Fury this same U.S. president okayed Operation Absolute Resolve that captured the Venezuelan president in his own home.  These actions and the demonstrated precision and tactical acumen are rewriting rulebooks.  I don’t know if this is a good thing or not.  I generally appreciate rule-breaking that creates new opportunities and new games.  I hope that what is on display during Epic Fury will be a harbinger of better things to come.
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This is a narrative war, and it is not just one between the United States and Iran.  The reactions to the war by so many voices formerly on the right of the American political spectrum and the almost uniform denunciation of all elements of the operation on the left demonstrates the effectiveness of the nearly two decades of narrative war waged through social media platforms and popular culture against the West and America.  America is at war with itself over this war and that is a direct result of the efforts of domestic actors as well as China and Russia to weaken the fabric of the American societal narrative.